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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGou h*
and Elinor H. Hitt
This Survey chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law
from June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009.1 This survey period saw continued
evolution of domestic relations law through changes in legislation and
case law. Legislation passed by the 2008 Georgia General Assembly
took effect on July 1, 2008. The Georgia Supreme Court continued to
accept nonfrivolous appeals in divorce cases, which provide guidance to
those interested in domestic relations law.
I.

CHILD CUSTODY

In Rumley-Miawama v. Miawama,' the Georgia Supreme Court
disapproved of language it interpreted to be a self-executing material
change in visitation.3 Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a
final judgment and divorce decree that awarded the parties joint legal
custody of the minor child. The trial court awarded the wife visitation
on alternate weeks, giving the parents equal amounts of time with the
child. However, the trial court alternatively ordered that if the wife
moved out of Georgia, she would be entitled to visitation on three-day
federal holidays, Thanksgiving, part of Christmas break, and for two
months in the summer. After the trial court denied the wife's motion for

* Partner in the firm of Warner, Mayoue, Bates & McGough, Atlanta, Georgia.

University of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963; LL.B., 1966). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Warner, Mayoue, Bates & McGough, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993); University of Georgia (M.S.W., 1996); Georgia State
University (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia domestic relations law during the prior survey period, see
Barry B. McGough & Elinor H. Hitt, Domestic Relations,Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
60 MERCER L. REV. 121 (2008).
2. 284 Ga. 811, 671 S.E.2d 827 (2009).
3. Id. at 814-15, 671 S.E.2d at 829-30.
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a new trial, the wife appealed, contending that the trial court erred in
establishing the alternate visitation schedule.4
With regard to this alternate visitation provision, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that a self-executing material change in visitation
violates the public policy of this state because it does not necessarily
consider the best interest of the child.5 The court further stated that
such a provision should only be implemented when there is evidence
that one or both parties have committed to a given course of action that
will be implemented at a given time; ... how that course of action will
impact upon the best interests of the child ... ; and the provision is
carefully crafted to address the effects on the offspring of that given
course of action.6
Further, such provisions "should be narrowly drafted to ensure
that they
7
will not impact adversely upon any child's best interests."
Here, the supreme court determined that the alternate visitation
provision was material because it substantially reduced the amount of
time the wife and her child would have together.8 The evidence at trial
did not establish that the wife had committed herself to an out-of-state
move. Also, the provision contained no time limitation restricting its
application.9 Therefore, the court struck the provision because it
improperly authorized an open-ended, automatic, and material change
in visitation. 10

II. CHILD SUPPORT
During this survey period, both Georgia appellate courts reviewed
cases in which child support was an issue. These cases were initiated
after the Georgia Child Support Guidelines11 became effective on
January 1, 2007. In Hampton v. Nesmith, 2 the trial court awarded the
mother an upward modification in child support from her daughter's
father, the mother appealed the ruling that delayed the initiation of the
father's increased obligation for fifteen months. 3

4. Id. at 811-12, 671 S.E.2d at 828.

5. Id. at 814, 671 S.E.2d at 829.
6. Id. at 813, 671 S.E.2d at 829.

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 813-14, 671 S.E.2d at 829.
Id. at 814, 671 S.E.2d at 829-30.

11.
12.

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (Supp. 2009).
294 Ga. App. 514, 669 S.E.2d 489 (2008).

13. Id. at 514, 515, 669 S.E.2d at 490, 491.
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The parties, who had never married, were the parents of a minor
child. In 2003 the father legitimated the child and was ordered to pay
$525 a month in child support. In March 2006 the father filed a petition
seeking, in part, a downward modification of his child support obligation.
The mother filed an answer and a counterclaim seeking unpaid child
support and an upward modification in the father's child support
obligation."4

In July 2007 the trial court held a bench trial. The father was found
in contempt for failing to pay $3990 in child support, and the trial court
ordered him to pay the arrearage at a rate of $300 per month beginning
in October 2007. The court also found that the father's income had
increased; thus, the court ordered an upward modification of his child
support obligation to $800 per month. However, the court delayed this
increase until October 2008 to allow the father to first pay the arrearage
due. 5
The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the mother's contention
that the trial court erred in delaying the effective date of the father's
increased child support obligation for fifteen months. 6 The court
pointed to the Georgia Child Support Guidelines, which provide as
follows:
If there is a difference of [thirty] percent or more between a new award
and a Georgia child support order entered prior to January 1, 2007, the
court may, at its discretion, phase in the new child support award over
a period of up to two years with the phasing in being largely evenly
distributed with at least an initial immediate adjustment of not less
than [twenty-five] percent of the difference and at least one intermediate adjustment prior to the final adjustment at the end of the phase-in
period. 7
The court concluded that even though the full implementation of an
upward modification may be delayed via a phase-in, the trial court "must
provide for some amount (not less than [twenty-five] percent) of the new
award to take effect immediately.""
In the instant case, the upward modification was more than a fifty
percent increase of the original child support award, but the trial court
completely delayed the increase for fifteen months instead of ordering a

14. Id. at 514-15, 669 S.E.2d at 490.
15. Id. at 515, 669 S.E.2d at 490-91.
16. Id. at 516, 669 S.E.2d at 491.
17. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-615(k)(3)(B)).
18. Id.
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phase-in of the modification. 9 The court of appeals vacated the portion
of the lower court's ruling that delayed the upward modification of
support for fifteen months.2 °
Both Georgia appellate courts considered cases that addressed
questions regarding income and deviations under the current Georgia
Child Support Guidelines. In Appling v. Tatum,2 the father appealed
the trial court's inclusion of income from his K-1 schedule in its
determination of his adjusted gross annual income for purposes of
calculating child support.22
At trial, the father's accountant testified that $198,000 of the father's
adjusted gross annual income constituted K-1 income he did not actually
receive because it was used to operate his business.' Section 19-624
15(f)(1)(B) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)
directs,
In general, income and expenses from self-employment or operation of
a business should be carefully reviewed by the court or the jury to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent
to satisfy a child support obligation. Generally, this amount will differ
from a determination of business income for tax purposes.25
Relying on this statute, the father argued that the income on his K-1
was not "available" to him and should not have been used to calculate
his child support payments. 26 However, the father cited no authority
in support of his position. Even his accountant conceded that the
Internal Revenue Service treats K-1 income as ordinary income.2 7
Additionally, the income reflected on a K-1 is not statutorily excluded
from gross income for the purposes of calculating child support.2 The
Georgia Court of Appeals held that the K-i reflected income in this case
and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it included the
K-1 income in its child support calculation.29

19. Id.
20. Id. at 518, 669 S.E.2d at 492.
21.

295 Ga. App. 78, 670 S.E.2d 795 (2008).

22. Id. at 79, 670 S.E.2d at 797.
23. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 798.
24. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(B) (Supp. 2009).

25. Id.
26. Appling, 295 Ga. App. at 80, 670 S.E.2d at 798.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing O.C.G-A. § 19-6-15(f)(2) (Supp. 2009)).
29. Id. at 80-81, 670 S.E.2d at 798.
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In Evans v. Evans,30 the mother appealed the trial court's decision
not to include overtime payments received by the father in its calculation
of his child support obligation. The trial court refused to include this
income because the overtime payments were not guaranteed income. 3'
On review, the Georgia Supreme Court relied on O.C.G.A. § 19-615(f)(1)(A), 3 2 which provides that in setting the presumptive amount of
child support, the gross income of each parent "shall include all income
from any source, before deductions for taxes and other deductions ..
whether earned or unearned, and includes, but is not limited to, ...
[olvertime payments.'
Because the child support guidelines "'are
mandatory and must be considered by a trier of fact setting the amount
of child support,'" the supreme court reversed the lower court's ruling. 4
The supreme court also heard cases involving the denial of deviations
to the presumptive amount of child support. In Rumley-Miawama v.
Miawama,6 the supreme court upheld a lower court's decision not to
apply a parenting time deviation to reduce the amount of child support
owed by the mother, even though the parents had equal parenting time
with the children.36 Similarly, in Johnson v. Johnson,7 the supreme

court upheld the lower court's decision not to include a deviation for the
children's private school tuition as extraordinary educational expenses
in its child support calculations.38 In both cases, the supreme court
pointed out that such deviations are within the court's discretion. 9
Effective July 1, 2008, the Georgia General Assembly amended
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15,4o in part, to change and clarify certain provisions
relating to gross income. 4' As amended, the statute makes clear that
income for a parent who is on active military duty includes: "(i) Base
pay; (ii) Drill pay; (iii) Basic allowance for subsistence, whether paid
directly to the parent or received in-kind; and (iv) Basic allowance for

30. 285 Ga. 319, 676 S.E.2d 180 (2009).
31. Id. at 319, 676 S.E.2d at 180-81.
32. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(A) (Supp. 2009).
33. Id. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(A)v).
34. Evans, 285 Ga. at 319,676 S.E.2d at 180-81 (quoting Swanson v. Swanson, 276 Ga.
566, 567, 580 S.E.2d 526, 527 (2003)).
35. 284 Ga. 811, 671 S.E.2d 827 (2009).
36. Id. at 812-13, 671 S.E.2d at 828 (citing Hamlin v. Ramey, 291 Ga. App. 222, 227,
661 S.E.2d 593, 597 (2008)).
37. 284 Ga. 366, 667 S.E.2d 350 (2008).
38. Id. at 367, 667 S.E.2d at 352.
39. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(iX2)(J)(i) (Supp. 2009)); Rumley-Miawama, 284 Ga.
at 813, 671 S.E.2d at 828-29 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(iX2XF) (Supp. 2009)).
40. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (2004 & Supp. 2009).
41. See 2008 Ga. Laws 272, 276.
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housing, whether paid directly to the parent or received in-kind."42
However, unless otherwise determined by the court or jury, "special pay
or incentive pay, allowances for clothing or family separation, and
reimbursed expenses related to the parent's assignment ... shall not be
considered income for the purpose of determining gross income."43
III.

DOMICILE

In Kean v. Marshall,"'the Georgia Court of Appeals considered the
question of domicile under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
(UIFSA).45 Waco Kean and Gina Marshall were the unmarried parents
of a child born in November 1996. In November 1997 an Alabama court
ordered Kean to pay support for the child. Pursuant to the UIFSA,
Marshall filed an action in April 2006 to record the Alabama order and
to request an upward modification in the amount of Kean's child support
payments. Marshall's complaint contended that Kean resided in Henry
County, Georgia, and thus was subject to Henry County's jurisdiction.4 6
Kean moved to dismiss the action based on lack of jurisdiction,
arguing that he was domiciled in Alabama because Alabama was the
state where he was born and reared, attended school, enlisted in the
Army, was registered to vote, paid income taxes, had a driver's license,
registered his vehicles, and lived with his wife and their children. Even
though he was stationed in Fort Gillem, Georgia, for military duty and
had an apartment in Stockbridge, Georgia, for occasions when he could
not return to Alabama, Kean alleged that he commuted daily to work
from Alabama and never intended to move to or remain in Georgia.4
After reviewing evidence that cast doubt on Kean's claim that he
generally commuted from Alabama to Fort Gillem, the trial court
concluded that Kean intended to remain at the Stockbridge apartment
indefinitely and was therefore subject to jurisdiction in Georgia. In
denying Kean's motion to dismiss, the trial court stated that Marshall
needed to show that Kean had minimum contacts with Georgia to
establish jurisdiction, and Marshall was not required to prove that
Georgia was Kean's domicile. The trial court determined that to exercise
jurisdiction over Kean pursuant to UIFSA, the court needed to find that
all parties resided in Georgia and that the child did not live in Alabama,
which was the issuing state. The trial court noted that the term reside

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(f)(1)(E).
Id.
294 Ga. App. 459, 669 S.E.2d 463 (2008).
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-11-100 to -191 (2004 & Supp. 2009).
Kean, 294 Ga. App. at 459, 669 S.E.2d at 463-64.
Id. at 459-60, 669 S.E.2d at 464.
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is not defined by UIFSA but determined that reside meant domicile for
purposes of the statute.48 Kean appealed the decision.49
The court of appeals reversed,5" holding that "[tlo acquire a domicile
in a particular jurisdiction, one must actually reside there with the
intention of remaining permanently or for an indefinite time, and a
domicile once established continues until a new domicile is acquired."51
Based on the evidence in the record, Kean did not reside in Georgia for
purposes of UIFSA."2 His domicile continued to be in Alabama because
there was no evidence he intended to remain in Georgia.5 3
IV. GARNISHMENT
In Stoker v.
the Georgia Court of Appeals clarified garnishment procedures pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-4-60,"6 O.C.G.A. § 19-617(e)(1),56 and O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(h)(3).1 7 In Stoker the former wife
filed a garnishment action against her former husband for $2350, which
represented one month of child support arrearages, and $6536, which
represented the former husband's share of health care expenses and the
cost of extracurricular activities. After a hearing, the trial court granted
the traverse filed by the former husband, and the former wife appealed.'
The court of appeals agreed with the former wife that the portion of
the alleged debt representing unpaid child support is governed by the
procedure for postjudgment garnishment. 59 The court stated,
Severin,s

Under Georgia law, a judgment for periodic child support that fixes the
amount of the installments and when they are due is a money
judgment subject to collection by postjudgment garnishment. This is
because a court can determine the amount due from the terms of the
decree with no more than a mathematical computation.'

48. Id. at 460, 669 S.E.2d at 464.

49. Id. at 459, 669 S.E.2d at 463.
50. Id. at 460, 669 S.E.2d at 464.
51. Id. at 461, 669 S.E.2d at 465 (citing Williams v. Williams, 191 Ga. 437, 438, 12

S.E.2d 352, 353 (1940)).
52. Id. at 462, 669 S.E.2d at 465-66.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id., 669 S.E.2d at 466.
292 Ga. App. 870, 665 S.E.2d 913 (2008).
O.C.G.A. § 18-4-60 (2004).
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-17(eXl) (2004).
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(h)(3) (Supp. 2009).
Stoker, 292 Ga. App. at 870-71, 665 S.E.2d at 915.
Id. at 871-72, 665 S.E.2d at 916 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 18-4-60 to -66 (2004 & Supp.

2009)).
60. Id. at 872, 665 S.E.2d at 916 (citations omitted).
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The court also noted that O.C.G.A. § 19-6-17(e)(1) "specifically provides
that '[any payment or installment of support under any child support
order is, on and after the date due[,] [a] judgment by operation of law,
with the full force and effect and attributes of a judgment of this state,
Accordingly, a plaintiff may
including the ability to be enforced."''
collect unpaid periodic child support under the postjudgment garnishment procedure without additional proceedings to first reduce the debt
to a money judgment.6 2 However, at the hearing on the traversed
garnishment, the former wife testified that the former husband was no
longer in arrears on child support.63
The former wife also argued that pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15
(h)(3), she was entitled to collect the former husband's share of
healthcare expenses and extracurricular costs through garnishment
without first obtaining "'a separate or discrete judgment or a contempt
The court noted that in O.C.G.A.
order concerning these claims. '"'
§ 19-6-15(hX3), which became effective on January 1, 2007, the collection
of uninsured health care expenses is specifically addressed.' The court
noted that O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(h)(3)(B)(i) directs that "[wihere child
support services pursues enforcement of payment of such unpaid
expenses," collection by garnishment "is permitted pursuant to the
postjudgment garnishment procedure, if the debt has been reduced to a
money judgment, or pursuant to the prejudgment garnishment
procedure, if the debt has not been reduced to a money judgment. " "
When a parent "seeks to collect the other parent's share of uninsured
health care expenses, the collecting parent 'may enforce payment of the
expense by any means permitted by law.'" 67 However, the court of
appeals disagreed with the former wife's contention that this provision
authorized garnishment for uninsured health care expenses that were
not reduced to a money judgment without complying with the more
Accordingly, the
restrictive prejudgment garnishment procedure.'
court of appeals ultimately upheld the traverse of garnishment because
the child support arrears had been paid and because the amount claimed

61.

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-6-17(eXl)).

Id.
Id. at 873, 665 S.E.2d at 916.
Id., 665 S.E.2d at 917.
Id. (citing 2006 Ga. Laws 583, 600).
66. Id. at 873-74, 665 S.E.2d at 917 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(hX3)(BXi)).
62.
63.
64.
65.
67.

Id. at 873, 665 S.E.2d at 917 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(hX3B)(i)).

68. Id. at 874 n.9, 665 S.E.2d at 917 n.9.
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to be owed for health care and extracurricular activities had not been
reduced to a judgment.69
V. JURISDICTION

Jurisdictional issues were addressed in several cases before both the
Georgia Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court. In Morris v.
Surges,7 ° the trial court found the former husband in contempt of a
provision of the divorce decree that awarded funds for the equitable
division of marital property.7 1 The Georgia Supreme Court granted
review primarily to decide whether the supreme court or the court of
appeals had jurisdiction over the former husband's application for
discretionary appeal.72
The supreme court held that an application for contempt is a motion
and not a complaint.73 Thus, contempt actions to enforce divorce
decrees are "'ancillary to the divorce action and not a new civil
action. '"74 Therefore, the supreme court has jurisdiction to hear an
appeal of this nature.7" The court noted,
The only recognized qualification of this principle is that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals "over appeals involving child custody but
not a judgment for divorce and alimony, carries with it jurisdiction
over" appeals in actions for contempt for violation of a child custody
provision in a divorce decree."6
Accordingly, "an appeal from a judgment in a contempt action seeking
to enforce any portion of the divorce decree other than child custody is
ancillary to divorce and alimony and falls within [the supreme court's]
jurisdiction over divorce and alimony cases."77 The court concluded
that this principle is consistent with the general rule that "'the appellate
court with subject-matter jurisdiction of the appeal from a judgment has
appellate subject-matter jurisdiction of a contempt action in which
enforcement of the judgment is sought.'"7

69. Id. at 875, 665 S.E.2d at 918.
70. 284 Ga. 748, 670 S.E.2d 84 (2008).
71. Id. at 749, 670 S.E.2d at 85-86.
72. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 86.
73. See id. at 750, 670 S.E.2d at 86.
74. Id. (quoting Brown v. King, 266 Ga. 890, 891, 472 S.E.2d 65, 66 (1996)).
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507, 508, 350 S.E.2d 437, 438 (1986)).
77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rogers v. McGahee, 278 Ga. 287,
288, 602 S.E.2d 582, 584 (2004)).
78. Id. (quoting Rogers, 278 Ga. at 288 n.1, 602 S.E.2d at 584 n.1).
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The Georgia Court of Appeals considered the General Assembly's
recent amendment to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34," 9 which addressed appeals to
modifications of child custody orders." In Moore v. Moore-McKinney,81
the father filed a petition in February 2008 to modify the divorce
decree's visitation schedule. Following a hearing, the trial court issued
a final order of modification, and the father appealed."2
The mother claimed that the father's direct appeal of the trial court's
order was improper.' The mother argued that the father was required
to follow the discretionary appeal procedure set forth in O.C.G.A. § 5-635,' and his failure to do so required that his appeal be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.85 The court of appeals disagreed, reasoning that
the recently amended O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11) provides that all
modifications of child custody orders filed on or after January 1, 2008,
are directly appealable.86 Therefore, it is unnecessary for appellants in
child custody cases to comply with the discretionary appeal procedures
of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35." 7
The mother also argued that the father's petition to modify the divorce
decree's visitation schedule was not a child custody case, and therefore,
it did not fall within the purview of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11). 8 As it is
well established that a change in visitation amounts to a change in
custody in legal contemplation, the court of appeals concluded that the
father's petition was a child custody case for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 5-634(a)(11) and was therefore directly appealable.89
The question of jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights
was examined in Amerson v. Vandiver.' In this case, the parties'
settlement agreement, dated March 2004 and incorporated into their
final divorce decree, provided that the father's parental rights would be
terminated and that such termination was in the best interests of the
children.91

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (1995 & Supp. 2009).
2007 Ga. Laws 554, 554-55.
297 Ga. App. 703, 678 S.E.2d 152 (2009).
Id. at 703, 678 S.E.2d at 154.
Id. at 704, 678 S.E.2d at 154.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (1995 & Supp. 2009).
Moore, 297 Ga. App. at 704 & n.1, 678 S.E.2d at 154 & n.1.
Id. at 704, 678 S.E.2d at 154.
Id. at 707, 678 S.E.2d at 156.
Id. at 704-05, 678 S.E.2d at 154.
Id. at 705, 678 S.E.2d at 154-55.
285 Ga. 49, 673 S.E.2d 850 (2009).
Id. at 49, 673 S.E.2d at 850.
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In March 2008 the father moved to set aside the divorce decree on the
ground that the superior court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to terminate his parental rights. Even though the agreement was a
voluntary contract between the parties, the father argued that it could
be construed to terminate his parental rights because the trial court set
aside so much of the final judgment.92 The case was transferred to the
juvenile court for final disposition on all issues regarding "termination
of parental rights, custody, visitation, child support, and all ancillary
matters necessary for the entry of a final judgment."3 The Georgia
Supreme Court granted the mother's application for interlocutory
appeal.'
The supreme court noted that "judicial approval of a parent's
voluntary agreement for the termination of his parental rights [is
authorized] when it is in the best interest of the child."95 However,
under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(a)(2)(C),' the juvenile court has exclusive
jurisdiction to initiate an action involving the termination of parental
rights, except in connection with adoption proceedings.9 7 The court
concluded that a "'superior court judge, upon hearing a divorce and child
custody case, does not have jurisdiction to terminate parental rights,' "98
and "parties cannot 'confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a court by
agreement or waive the defense by failing to raise it [at] trial.' 99
However, the supreme court held that the father in this case failed to
exercise "utmost promptness" in bringing his motion to set aside.'0 0
The father's delay to act, coupled with his "acts and omissions

. . .

prior

to the divorce decree," constituted behavior that when relied on by the
mother, estopped the father from attacking the decree as void. 10 1
Finally, the court of appeals addressed the question of jurisdiction
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA) °2 in Hall v. Wellborn."° In December 2003, as part of a
divorce proceeding in Bibb County, Georgia, between Elizabeth Hall and
her former husband, the court awarded temporary custody of J.H. (a

92. Id., 673 S.E.2d at 850-51.
93. Id., 673 S.E.2d at 851.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 280 Ga. 88, 89, 623 S.E.2d 477, 478 (2005)).
96. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(aX2)(C) (2008 & Supp. 2009).

97. Amerson, 285 Ga. at 50, 673 S.E.2d at 851.
98.

Id. (quoting Cothran v. Cothran, 237 Ga. 487, 487, 228 S.E.2d 872, 872 (1976)).

99. Id. (quoting Abushmais v. Erby, 282 Ga. 619, 622, 652 S.E.2d 549, 552 (2007)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102.
103.

O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to -104 (2004).
295 Ga. App. 884, 673 S.E.2d 341 (2009).
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minor child) to Hall and ordered paternity testing. In May 2004 Jack
Wellborn was determined to be J.H.'s father, and the former husband
was relieved of any obligation to the child. Wellborn was not a party in
the prior custody proceeding nor was he served. In July 2006 Wellborn
filed a paternity action in the circuit court of Walton County, Florida,
where the child and the parties then lived, seeking sole custody of J.H.
In December 2006 the court awarded Wellborn primary custody and
granted Hall visitation rights.1"
In October 2007 Hall challenged the Florida court's jurisdiction in
light of the initial custody award in Bibb County, and she moved to
abate the December 2006 order. In January 2008 the Florida court
denied Hall's motion. She then filed suit in the Superior Court of
Stewart County, Georgia, and sought enforcement of the original Bibb
County order that awarded her custody of the child instead of her former
husband. The Stewart County court ruled that it could not exercise
jurisdiction on account of the Florida court's exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction. Hall appealed. 0 5
The court of appeals held that under the UCCJEA, adopted by Georgia
in 2001,1°6 the Georgia court that makes an initial determination of
child custody generally has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over
custody matters except when
(1) [a] court of this state determines that neither the child nor the
child's parents... has a significant connection with this state and that
substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(2) [a] court of this state or a court of another state determines that
neither the child nor the child's parents or any person acting as a
parent presently resides in this state.' °7
Hall argued that exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the custody of
J.H. was vested with the court in Bibb County when that court made its
initial custody award to her"'( However, the court noted that both
parents admitted in the Florida action that they resided in Florida with
the child, and the Florida court determined it had jurisdiction based on
this fact. 1" Because the Florida court determined that neither the
child nor its parents resided in Georgia, the court of appeals held that

104. Id. at 884, 673 S.E.2d at 342.
105. Id.

106. 2001 Ga. Laws 129.
107. Hall, 295 Ga. App. at 885, 673 S.E.2d at 343 (second alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting O.C.GA § 19-9-62(a)).

108. Id.
109. Id. at 885--86, 673 S.E.2d at 343.
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the Bibb County court lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. n °
Ultimately, the court of appeals upheld the Stewart County trial court,
ruling that it correctly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction."'
VI.

LEGITIMATION

During this survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals was presented
with an issue of first impression: "[Clan a father who has fully paid child
support and demonstrated at least some interest in developing a
relationship with his child be deemed to have legally abandoned that
3 the parties were unmarried, though
child?""' In Binns v. Fairnot,"
engaged in a three-year relationship, when the mother became pregnant
and gave birth to a daughter in July 2003. In January 2007 the father
filed a petition to legitimate the child and for visitation rights. The trial
court denied this petition because it found that the father had abandoned his opportunity to develop a relationship with the child. The
father subsequently appealed. 4
The court of appeals stated that the first issue to be addressed when
considering a petition to legitimate a child is "whether the biological
father has abandoned his opportunity interest to develop a relationship
with the child."115 Next, the trial court must determine whether the
legitimation is appropriate based on either a test of the father's fitness
or the best interest of the child standard, "'depending on the nature of
the [biological] father's relationship with the child and other surrounding
116
circumstances.'"
Following the birth of his daughter, the father was initially involved
in the child's life, including purchasing items for the child, keeping the
child overnight, and paying child support after paternity was established. The paternal grandmother came to Georgia to provide childcare
when the mother returned to work. In 2005 the mother, who served in
the military, was deployed to Iraq for one year. During this time, the
child resided with the maternal grandmother in Florida. The mother
admittedly did not notify the father that the child was in Florida. When
the mother returned from duty, she and her new husband obtained a

110. Id. at 886, 673 S.E.2d at 343.
111. Id.
112. Binns v. Fairnot, 292 Ga. App. 336, 338, 665 S.E.2d 36, 39 (2008).
113. 292 Ga. App. 336, 665 S.E.2d 36 (2008).
114. Id. at 336-37, 665 S.E.2d at 37-38.
115. Id. at 336, 665 S.E.2d at 38 (citing Jones v. Smith, 250 Ga. App. 486, 486, 552
S.E.2d 112, 113 (2001)).
116. Id. at 336-37, 665 S.E.2d at 38 (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 250 Ga.
App. at 486, 552 S.E.2d at 113).
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new address in Georgia and again did not notify the father of the child's
return to Georgia or provide the father with an address or phone
number.117

In making its determination, "the trial court focused on what [the
father] did not do.""' Specifically, he had no contact with the child
after August 2004.19 However, the court of appeals minimized this
fact by noting it was undisputed that the mother did not apprise the
father of the child's whereabouts after 2005.12° The trial court "faulted
the father for failing to do more to locate [or] contact the child during
this time."121 However, the court of appeals held that even if the
father could have done more, the evidence did not support finding that
he did so little as to constitute abandonment. 122 The court of appeals
concluded that the father's "constant payment of financial support
coupled with his avowed interest in establishing and maintaining a
relationship with the child mitigate against a finding of abandonment,
1 23
and the trial court abused its discretion in holding otherwise."
Further, the court of appeals noted that "in finding that [the father]
abandoned his opportunity interest, the trial court failed to ascertain
whether legitimation was in the child's best interest. " 124 Therefore, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded for a
determination about the second prong of the legitimation inquiry. 2 5
Effective July 1, 2008, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-21.1126 provides that "[pirior
to the child's first birthday, a father of a child born out of wedlock may
render his relationship with the child legitimate when both the mother
and father have freely agreed, consented, and signed a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity and an acknowledgment of legitimation."127 However, the "[violuntary acknowledgment of legitimation
[does] not authorize the father to receive custody or visitation until there
is a judicial determination of custody or visitation."128

117.
118.

Id. at 337, 665 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. at 338, 665 S.E.2d at 39.

119. Id.
120.

Id.

121. Id.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. (citing Bowers v. Pearson, 271 Ga. App. 266, 270-71, 609 S.E.2d 174, 177-78

(2005)).
124. Id. at 339, 665 S.E.2d at 39 (citing Jones, 250 Ga. App. at 486, 552 S.E.2d at 112).
125.

Id. (citing In re M.K, 288 Ga. App. 71, 74, 653 S.E.2d 354, 357 (2007)).

126. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-21.1 (Supp. 2009).
127. Id. § 19-7-21.1(b).
128. Id. § 19-7-21.1(e).
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VII.
In Harvey v. Sessoms,

29

PARTITION

the Georgia Supreme Court faced the issue

of partition. In this case, the parties divorced in 1970 by a final
judgment and divorce decree that awarded the wife "permanent
possession" of the marital home and kept title to the property remaining
in both the husband and the wife. The wife lived in the home until 2004
when she moved out and rented the home to a third party, retaining the
rental income. The husband then filed a petition for statutory partition,
claiming that the wife gave up possession of the marital home when she
moved out. The husband also sought an accounting of the rental income
and profits. The trial court determined that the 1970 final judgment
and divorce decree placed the property of the tenants in common in the
exclusive possession of one tenant and worked as an impediment to
partitioning. The trial court granted summary judgment to the wife,
and the husband appealed. 3 °
As a result of the divorce decree, the parties were tenants in common
with regard to the property, and each owned a one-half undivided
interest thereto.131 Therefore, as a tenant in common with no direction
regarding how the property must be divided, the husband was authorized under O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160132 to petition for a statutory partition1 33
ing.
The court stated that the "'right of partition may be surrendered by
contract.' 134 Additionally, when a party agrees to relinquish his right
to partition, either expressly or impliedly, partition will not be granted. 135 In this case, the court determined that the husband did not
execute an agreement by which he surrendered his right to partition. 131 The supreme court disapproved of Blalock v. Blalock137 and
White v. White138 to the extent they could be read as finding a relin-

129. 284 Ga. 75, 663 S.E.2d 210 (2008).
130. Id. at 75, 663 S.E.2d at 211.
131. Id. at 76, 663 S.E.2d at 211.
132. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-160 (1991).
133. Harvey, 284 Ga. at 76, 663 S.E.2d at 211 (citing Mansour Prop. L.L.C. v. 1-85/Ga.
20 Ventures, Inc., 277 Ga. 632, 633-34, 592 S.E.2d 836, 837 (2004)).
134. Id. at 77,663 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting 1 DANIEL F. HINKEL, PINDAR'S GEORGIA REAL
ESTATE LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7-103 (6th ed. 2004)).

135.

Id. (citing Mansour Prop., 277 Ga. at 634, 592 S.E.2d at 837-38).

136.

Id.

137. 250 Ga. 862, 301 S.E.2d 876 (1983).
138. 253 Ga. 388, 320 S.E.2d 757 (1984).
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quishment of the
right to partition in a judicial decree unsupported by
139
an agreement.
VIII. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
The Georgia Supreme Court granted discretionary review in Garcia v.
Garcia,40 and it took the opportunity to clarify its previous application
of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to require the payment of child
support by a man who was neither the biological nor the adoptive father
of a child.141 In this case, Christopher Garcia appealed a final judgment and divorce decree that ordered him to pay support for a child who
was not his biological daughter and who was eight years old when
Garcia married the child's mother in 2002.142
In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the court distinguished
Wright v. Newman,'4 ' a case in which the court had applied the
doctrine of promissory estoppel to require the payment of child support
by a man who was neither the biological nor the adoptive father of a
child.'44 In making this distinction, the court pointed out that in
Wright,
the evidence showed the man had promised the child and the child's
mother that he would assume all obligations and responsibilities of
fatherhood, including providing support; had held himself out as the
father of the child and allowed the child to consider him as the
biological father; and the evidence showed that the mother and child
relied upon the promise to their detriment.14
The court acknowledged that there was evidence that Garcia sought
to amend the child's birth certificate when he knew that he was not the
biological father and that he promised to assume the obligations and
responsibilities of fatherhood, including providing support. 4 6 However, the court reasoned that this case differed from Wright because there
was no evidence in this case showing that the mother's reliance upon
Garcia's promise caused the mother to forego a valuable legal right to
her detriment-specifically, her legal right to seek child support from the

139. Harvey, 284 Ga. at 77, 663 S.E.2d at 212.
140. 284 Ga. 152, 663 S.E.2d 709 (2008).
141. See id. at 152-53, 663 S.E.2d at 709-10.
142. Id. at 152, 663 S.E.2d at 709-10.
143. 266 Ga. 519, 467 S.E.2d 533 (1996).
144. Garcia, 284 Ga. at 152, 663 S.E.2d at 710 (citing Wright, 266 Ga. at 520-21, 467
S.E.2d at 534-35).
145. Id. at 152-53, 663 S.E.2d at 710 (citing Wright, 266 Ga. at 520-21, 467 S.E.2d at
534-35).
146. Id. at 153, 663 S.E.2d at 710.
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child's biological father.147 Thus, the elements of the promissory
estoppel doctrine were not fulfilled, making the trial court's application
of it in this case improper. 4"

147. Id. at 153-54, 663 S.E.2d at 710.
148. Id. at 154, 663 S.E.2d at 711.

